The President of the European Commission, Mrs. von der Leyen is quoted as follows in the introduction of the 2024 Enlargement Package: “The tense geopolitical context makes it more compelling than ever that we complete the reunification of our continent, under the same values of democracy and the rule of law. We have already taken great strides over the last years towards integrating new Member States. And enlargement will remain a top priority of the new Commission”. See https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2024-enlargement-package-2024-10-30_en
Mrs. von der Leyen expresses current thinking if we forgive imprecise language: the European Union is not after reunification of Europe. We are not about including the Russian Federation nor Belarus. Did we take great strides in integrating new Member States, or is the outcome thus far a disappointing mixed bag? And third, what is the geopolitical advantage for the EU of a new Member State if it is not aligned with our values? Hungary is the egregious case now, but Poland was that recently. Romania and Bulgaria are basket cases. There are serious questions regarding Slovakia as well.
Turning to enlargement: Serbia is playing the EU for fool, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a deeply divided country. A constituent part, the Republika Srpska, is doing its worst to sabotage the state. Accession to the European Union requires well-functioning institutions, not sabotage. The negotiations with Türkiye and, recently, Georgia, are in abeyance. Commitment of some parties of the governing coalition in Montenegro to the European project is doubtful. Its good technical progress is not substitute for commitment. It is too early to say how the negotiations with North Macedonia will go. It is even more difficult to envision the course of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova at the moment. The European Union may unfold a grand geopolitical vision but the candidate countries have to do the heavy lifting. If they won’t, the European strategy will remain wishful thinking. Realism, please!
Later in the introduction, the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations warns: “The enlargement process continues to be merit-based and depends on the objective progress made by each of the partners. This requires determination to implement irreversible reforms in all areas of EU law, with special emphasis on the fundamentals of the enlargement process. Democracy, the rule of law and fundamental values will continue to be the cornerstones of the EU’s enlargement policy.” The passage ends with these salutary words: “EU membership remains a strategic choice”
In this blog we question whether Serbia considers EU membership a strategic choice. Is its heart still beating for Russia, while its wallet is reaching for the wealth of the EU? A two-pronged p0licy? We will discuss the state of preparedness for accession of a number of other candidate countries in subsequent blogs.
If Serbia considers membership a strategic choice we should ask why it pursues its traditional balancing act between the Russian Federation and the West. If it is serious about entering the EU, why does it take so long to put its house in order and get ready to become a Member State? The accession negotiations started in 2014 and we haven’t advanced much on key questions 11 years later.
The Commission notes in its 2024 report that the Serbian government has continued to declare EU membership its strategic goal. It acknowledges that recent early elections and the corresponding break in the functioning of Government and Parliament are a reason for the slowdown in the progress of reforms, but we should ask ourselves whether that is a valid explanation for the disappointing progress during 10 previous years? Is the real problem, once diplomatic circumlocution is filtered out, that in fact there is not enough appetite for membership among the Serbian population and the government?
The Commission’s report urges the Serbian authorities to take stronger responsibility for a proactive and objective communication on Serbia’s accession process and the EU. Disinformation is rife, the government prefers blaming the European Union for its slow progress towards the European Union, on the unresolved issues in the dialogue with Kosovo, rather than speeding up reforms and mounting a full throated defense of its European aspirations. One sometimes gets the impression that the EU is asked to do the heavy lifting, not Serbia. But why? Are the Serbian authorities realizing that support for accession, partly because of their own doings, is at an all-time low? According to a public opinion poll taken December 2022 by the Serbian Ministry of European Integration support for Serbia’s accession to the EU dropped to 43%, while 32% of the polled persons oppose membership. Ony a third of the polled had a positive image of the EU. In the earliest Serbian opinion poll, May 2008, 54% of the polled had a positive image of the EU. It steadily went south from there. This is alarming as the popularity of the EU generally drops after accession. Further, should accession be granted if only a relative majority may be in favour? Would it not be better only to accept membership of a candidate country to the EU if a solid two thirds of the population support this, a majority that is usually considered constitutional?
The EU stresses that it is by far Serbia’s main political and economic partner. It accounted for 59,7% of Serbia’s total trade and 48% of its FDI inflows in 2023. FDI inflows from China amouted to about a quarter of total inflows between 2021 and 2023, while it accounted for 8,6% of Serbia’s trade, and Russia 4,1%. Serbs would be foolish to forego the economic relationship with the EU, but is accession to the EU the only way to safeguard this relationship? The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Serbia and the EU of 2013 offers ample opportunity to gradually establish a bilateral free trade area over a period of six years, and discover during that period whether Serbia really wants to pursue membership of the EU.
Why, indeed, does the Serbian government allow support for accession to the Union to slide. Why does it not take a forceful lead in putting its own case for accession to the people? Is it afraid of a back-lash related to Kosovo if it would push for accession? Are the emotions surrounding the normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo the reason? Are Tito’s lessons, playing the Sovjet block against the West, difficult to unlearn? Further, what importance do Serbia’s historical and cultural ties with Russia – and the clever exploitation of these ties by Russia – have in Serbian calculations?
The government is doubtlessly convinced that Serbia’s economic future is best served by entering the EU. Is it, however, prepared to reform the country from top to bottom to achieve this? Creating the conditions for a vibrant democracy, a truly independent judiciary, free media, and a functioning market economy which is what the EU demands, means loosening the state’s and government grip on power, creating a rules-based rather than a command-based society. Does the government dare to take the jump? If not, is it wise to add another illiberal democracy to the one we already have?
I am convinced that the otherwise inexplicable lack of progress in the accession negotiations is not due to technical difficulties in readying Serbia for membership of the EU but to politics. Former COMECON countries that are now member of the EU overcame a worse starting position than Serbia in transforming their economies within less time than the 11 years Serbia has partially squandered. Political questions are impeding progress.
And the EU? The Commission and the member states are well aware of Serbian thinking and the political counter-currents, of its lack of progress and its procrastination in key issues. They are far from being fooled but appear resigned to put a good face to a the situation and continue with the negotiations as usual and providing Serbia with economic, financial, and technical support without convincing evidence that it will help Serbia to become a member state in the foreseeable future. Technical continuity is so much easier than facing difficult questions, and Serbia is not fooled either. It is well aware that the Commission’s proposal to open an innocuous technical cluster – competitiveness and inclusive growth – as Serbia has met the technical benchmarks is an expression of resigned automatism, more tailored to engineer stability in the Western Balkans now than to address the fundamental question whether Serbia is really preparing for membership.
The Netherlands government has apparently decided to cut through this web of resigned automatism in the negotiations by indicating that it will oppose the opening of this technical cluster as it rightly estimates that Serbia has not made enough progress regarding the rule of law and the dialogue with Kosovo.
It must be hoped that Serbia will see this as a wake-up call: preparing Serbia for membership is difficult but not so difficult at to justify such slow progress. Other countries have shown the way in much shorter time-frames.
LLS/20-12-2024